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ABSTRACT: The transformation of water services that began with the privatisation of water companies in 1989 
extended to households with the implementation of water metering. Meters 'privatised' water and the cost of 
provision by allocating to individual households costs that had previously been shared within the community. This 
(ongoing) conversion of common pool good to private good has mostly improved economic, environmental and 
social impacts, but the potential burden of metering on poorer households has slowed the transition. Stronger 
anti-poverty programmes would be better at addressing this poverty barrier than existing coping mechanisms 
reliant on subsidies from other water consumers. 
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COMMUNITY OR PRIVATE WATER SERVICES? 
Water utilities around the world face pressure to reduce water use, improve services, and cover costs. 
A move from unmetered to metered water services can make it easier to address these pressures, but 
that move brings transition costs and – more importantly – an entirely different discourse over the role 
of water in the community (Bakker, 2001). The transformation from treating water service as a 
common pool good provided to all in the name of social equity into a private good provided to paying 
customers in the name of economic efficiency generates a variety of reactions, as can be seen in these 
examples from Dublin, Sacramento and Harare: 
Protests have taken place in different parts of the country, usually when contractors come to install meters 
for the new water-charging regime…"I don’t think the government realises how much of a burden it would 
be to the people around this area who are already stretched financially – paying tax after tax after tax – 
and this is just one tax too far". …Those behind water charging also say it will help conservation – as people 
will be more careful in their usage (Fleming, 2014). 
About a hundred years ago, the city of Sacramento wrote protections from metering into its charter, 
vowing that residents would always have the right to use as much water as they needed. But a series of 
droughts in recent decades led to concerns that unmetered water use would slow down conservation 
efforts…"Half the city is still on a flat rate, and we have no way of knowing how much water they’re using" 
(Bernstein, 2015). 
Currently, the City of Harare collects over 50% of revenue from rates and little has been done to address 
the challenges of water supply and availability. We are not convinced that any new revenue flows [from 
prepaid meters] will lead to improvements in water supply…There has not been a clear package for free 
water that can be easily managed by this system as demanded by the new Constitution (Nleya, 2015). 
This paper will describe how the installation of residential water meters in England and Wales is part of 
a larger programme for privatising water services in the name of economic efficiency, environmental 
sustainability and social equity. The next section explains the theoretical rationale for managing water 
as a common pool or private good. The sections that follow describe how metering has been 
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implemented, and the economic, environmental and social impacts of metering. The paper concludes 
with suggestions for improvement, i.e. fiscal transfers that could support metering by rebalancing 
individual and government payments for private and social goods. 
WATER AS A COMMON POOL OR PRIVATE GOOD 
Economics is known for its focus on managing scarce time, money, and other resources. The nonscarce 
nature of some goods (e.g. knowledge) led Samuelson (1954) to define 'public goods' as those anyone 
could access (non-excludable) and everyone could consume (nonrival). Private and public goods were 
quickly joined by common pool and club goods when it became necessary to explain the risk of 
exhausting non-excludable goods and the exclusionary means of making a potentially scarce good 
nonrival, respectively (Buchanan, 1965; Olson, 1965). Table 1 summarises these ideas in a simplified 
form. 
Table 1. Water can be any of four types of goods, depending on its characteristics for rivalry and 
excludability. 
 Excludable Non-excludable 
Rival Private good Common-pool good 
Nonrival Club good Public good 
Source: based on Cornes and Sandler (1986). 
A good should be managed according to its nature (rival goods are consumed in use) and accessibility 
(people can be prevented from using excludable goods), but a good can move from one type to another 
if it is managed differently or a supply-demand mismatch grows. A move for either reason will affect 
consumers and producers of the good, but people tend to be more critical of impacts resulting from 
management decisions. A decision to restrict irrigation flows to farmers, for example, will be more 
controversial than a drop in supplies due to a drought. Potential controversy should not excuse inaction 
if business as usual will result private and social costs from misuse or destruction of the good 
(Hardin, 1968). 
The need to match the characteristics of a good to its management can be dated to Pigou (1920) and 
Coase (1960) who discussed, respectively, the need to tax private activities that polluted the commons 
and the benefits of assigning property rights as a means of resolving disputes over use of the commons. 
Both authors made it clear that such moves – by 'internalising externalities' – would enhance both 
efficiency and equity, i.e. encouraging actions whose benefits exceeded their costs by assigning costs to 
those receiving benefits. 
Water can take the characteristics of any of the four types of goods in Table 1, and changes in these 
characteristics can change a water’s 'type'. A (club good) reservoir full of water shared among a few 
households can turn into a rivalrous (common pool) good if its level drops too much or other 
households are allowed access. The character of the reservoir as a clean (public good) recreational area 
might be put at risk if nearby residents 'free ride', i.e. they do not contribute to (common pool) 
measures to protect it from pollution (Olson, 1965). In each of these examples, rivalry or lack of 
cooperation reduce the flow of benefits from water. 
Private and social funding for water services 
Water utilities provide drinking and wastewater services to consumers in their service area. When 
water is abundant and costs are paid, then everyone can consume as much as they want. Revenues can 
come from tariffs (consumer money) or taxes and transfers (usually via governments taking money 
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from others). Sustainable water services can be funded exclusively by either of these sources (private or 
social, respectively), but most utilities are funded by a hybrid mix of tariffs, taxes and transfers. 
Water utilities usually run into problems when costs outpace available funding. In a purely private 
case, consumers will usually pay more because the value of reliable water services is so high. In a purely 
social case, outsiders may not pay additional costs, leaving consumers with a choice between paying or 
receiving less service. It is common in hybrid cases to have disputes over the relative contributions of 
revenue from tariffs, taxes and transfers, as each source would prefer to free ride on the others’ 
contribution. 
Switching funding sources 
Water services have been financed through private, social and hybrid means over the millennia 
(Fagan, 2011; Salzman, 2012). Water users in different systems settle into different habits and 
expectations as they benefit from their systems. Changes in costs or services will be greeted with 
caution if seen as necessary but hostility if seen as harmful (Kahneman et al., 1990). Water users may 
not like using less water in a drought, but many will cut back if they see their neighbours doing the 
same (Cart, 2009). Users are more likely to oppose change that benefits others at a cost to themselves. 
A government regulation restricting water use during a drought, so as to leave more water for river 
flows, might not result in the same conservation as a programme directing savings to a drinking water 
reservoir. 
The shift to residential metering water in England and Wales began in 1989 with a decision to 
rebalance the hybrid system from social to private funding. This move was driven by the need for 
greater spending on deteriorating infrastructure and an ideological desire to reduce free riding in the 
water sector. The shift in the water services model from a collectively financed common pool good to a 
user-financed private good was going to involve transaction costs (e.g. installing meters), but those 
were considered acceptable for the proposed efficiency gains (Matthews, 1992). 
Although the move to metering promised net benefits in terms of improving operating efficiency 
and allocating costs to users, that net benefit masked the distribution of net gains to some and net 
losses to others. It was the prospect of those losses, especially to poorer families facing higher bills, that 
led many to attribute additional, perhaps unacceptable, costs to the change (Bakker, 2001). 
Conventional definitions of economic efficiency tend to support a policy change if 'winners' can 
hypothetically compensate 'losers', but support for change will plummet if this 'Kaldor Hicks' 
compensation does not arrive (Hicks, 1939; Kaldor, 1939). The rest of the paper will explore how 
changes produced net gains but gave only weak compensation to losers. Although some have blamed 
metering for causing those losses, it turns out that metering merely called attention to existing 
problems of poverty – problems that meters (as a means of improving services) might help address. 
THATCHER PRIVATISES WATER SERVICES 
The 1974 nationalisations of water services were followed by policies designed to harmonise charges 
across the country by transferring funds from utilities with cheaper services to those with more 
expensive services, such that average household bills would converge, respectively, from below and 
above. These policies, in line with the theory on common pool goods, increased infrastructure decay, 
overstaffing and complaints of free riding. Margaret Thatcher’s 1979 election brought cost-benefit 
analysis and efficiency targets back into use (Bakker, 2001). 
Privatisation under the 1989 Water Act pushed utilities to improve their performance. The regulator 
used price and profit incentives to reward improvements and investments in repairing and improving 
networks to meet EU regulations on water quality (i.e. upgrading sewerage) and reduce environmental 
pressures (WFD, 2000). The Act also promised that consumers would pay metered charges, thereby 
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severing links with their neighbours’ wealth or consumption (Matthews, 1992; van den Berg, 1997). 
Incentives meant that new private water companies (PWCs) would profit if they exceeded expectations, 
just as consumers would pay less if they reduced their burden on the system. On the loss side, PWCs 
would be fined or face price reductions if they fell short of regulatory targets. Consumers, likewise, 
were expected to pay for waste from open taps or leaks. Although these incentives are similar in their 
reward/punishment structure, they were often criticised as favouring PWCs over consumers. 
Commodified water services, in the words of Bakker (2001), replaced 'social equity' (sharing water and 
costs) with 'economic equity' (payment for services).  
Although routinely condemned as 'neoliberal' (Ogden, 1995; van den Berg, 1997; Bakker, 2005), it 
made good sense to stop managing household water as a rival, non-excludable common pool good and 
start managing it as a rival, excludable private good when both water and money were in short supply 
(EA, 2009; Ofwat, 2014a). Ostrom et al. (1994: 15) explain the rationale in terms of a common pool 
'situation' turning into a 'dilemma' if potential rivalry turns into actual rivalry over a good – water 
services in this case. Although a dilemma can be resolved by strengthening measures against free riders 
and promoting cooperation, it can also be resolved by making the good excludable by, for example, 
installing meters to allocate costs and water to households as private goods.1 
These options explain why each country in the United Kingdom has its own model for residential 
water and sewerage services. Northern Ireland Water and Scottish Water, both public corporations, 
provide free and at-cost services, respectively. Investor-owned PWCs in England and Wales provide 
services at regulated prices. Dwr Cymru/Welsh Water (DCWW) was taken over in 2001 by Glas Cymru, a 
private nonprofit that operates 'in the interest of Welsh customers'.2 This paper focuses mainly on the 
English PWCs but refers occasionally to DCWW. 
The 32 PWCs providing water services in England and Wales are regulated by the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), its subsidiary Environment Agency (EA), and the Water 
Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat, a nonministerial government department).3 These agencies (or 
their Welsh equivalents) oversee metering requirements, environmental limits (e.g. classification of 
water stress) and metering implementation, respectively. The Consumer Council for Water (CCW) 
represents consumer interests. The Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) regulates the quality of drinking 
water. 
Charges for residential water services were based historically on Rateable Value (RV), a measure of 
the 1990 rental value of a house.4 The 1989 Water Act set out to replace RV with residential service 
charges that allocated costs according to metered consumption (90%of nonresidential consumers have 
meters), which meant that metering would have to increase dramatically from near-zero levels in 1989 
if it was going to hit its year-2000 target of universal metering (Parliament, 1989; Ofwat, 2006; Owen, 
                                                          
1
 The service area of each PWC can be seen as a club good if it has adequate local water and funding. Operational or fiscal 
spillovers create a common pool dilemma on a national scale when they deplete the environment or government funds. 
2
 Dee Valley Water Company supplies water to about 1.5% of the population of Wales. The services boundaries of Severn Trent 
and DCWW cross the Welsh-England border. See Owen (2013) for an excellent overview of DCWWʼs history and operations. 
3
 According to Ofwat (n.d.b), 18 regional monopolies (including DCWW) provide water or water and sewerage services. The 
rest are smaller or provide water to larger consumers. Companies may have changed their names, policies, and service areas 
over the time period covered here. 
4
 According to Ofwat (n.d.a), "Rateable value was a local authority's assessment of the annual rental value of an individual 
property. Rateable value assessments were carried out between 1973 and 1990. Each local authority took a number of factors 
into account when it set rateable values. These included the size and general condition of the property and the availability of 
local services. We have no specific details about how properties were assessed and cannot tell you why similar properties have 
a different rateable value. Rateable values were last updated in 1990 so any changes to your property since then will not be 
reflected in your rateable value." 
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2015).5 The Act required that new residences have water meters. Existing residences would get meters 
if consumers (as 'optants') asked for them. Although the Act incentivised switching, progress was slow. 
The Water Industry Act of 1999 thus gave PWCs permission to install meters for consumers who 
changed houses, lived in water-stressed areas, or whose residences had 'heavy-demand characteristics' 
such as pools or lawn sprinklers (Ofwat, 2011b). 
The materials and labour cost of installing a meter on the request of an optant or a change of 
occupancy meter is about £220. This cost would be 20-50% lower if meters were universal 
(EA, 2008; Walker, 2009). Although the installation cost is borne nominally by PWCs ('you pay nothing 
now'), it is shared among metered consumers, via 'differential charges' representing the higher costs of 
metered services. Recurring costs of approximately £30 per year (mostly in higher labour costs) per 
meter would drop by at least 20% with universal metering (Walker, 2009). Ofwat (2011b) defines 
'universal' metering achieved at 90% penetration because residences with complex plumbing are 
expensive to meter, not inefficient water savings. Barraqué (2011) argues that meters are useful in 
single family homes when garden consumption is elastic to price, but inefficient in individual 
apartments because the extra annual cost of metering and billing far exceeds the benefit of water 
conserved. He prefers to meter an entire building with a smart meter so as to develop new customer 
relations (e.g. early leaks warning) while leaving the division of those costs to the building’s inhabitants. 
Such a system will work if tenants use similar volumes of water. 
Residential metering penetration has grown from 30% in 2008 to 50% in 2015 (see Table 2). Most of 
the gains come from installations for new houses, changes in occupancy and water-stress designations 
(EA, 2008). Why have so few people opted for meters? According to MVA (2006), a majority of 
unmetered consumers do not care enough to switch while the rest worry about privacy or cost. 
These concerns are not necessarily 'efficient' in their implications. Consumers asked for responses to 
water scarcity, for example, favour subsidies for saving water (e.g. rebates on water-saving appliances) 
and regulations on water use (e.g. bans on hosepipes) over volumetric charges (Opinion Leader, 2006). 
This answer leaves them with an admirable scope for action, but it ignores evidence that price 
incentives play a useful role in conservation (Loaiciga and Renehan, 1997; Reynaud, 2013; Ferraro and 
Price, 2013). Turning to cost, Dalziel et al. (2014) report that 72% of metered consumers (vs. 62% of 
unmetered consumers) found their bills to be affordable; 58% of metered consumers (vs. 50% of 
unmetered consumers) found their bills to be fair; and 61% percent of optants (vs. 52% of compulsory 
metered consumers) found their bills to be fair. These results may explain why meters are 'obviously 
necessary' to some, 'obviously mistaken' to others, and slow to appear in people’s homes. The following 
sections will examine the economic, environmental and social impacts of metering in an attempt to 
explain their contradictions. 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
The change in managing water as a common pool good to treating it as a private good will change the 
way water is consumed, the relation between the user and supplier of water, and PWC accounting, 
operations and investments. 
                                                          
5
 The cost of serving consumers always varies. Consumers at the end of a long road cost more to reach than consumers in the 
city centre. Consumers who dump chemicals in drains create more costs than consumers who do not. These disparities mean 
that water prices based on average cost ('postage stamp pricing') also result in cross-subsidies among consumers, but these 
subsidies are much smaller than they would be with fixed (RV-style) charges alone. 
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Table 2. Residential metering (%) by water company in regions of 'serious' stress (top) and 'not serious' 
stress (bottom).  
Company  2008  2015-2016  2019-2020 
Affinity  49 52 72 
Anglian 57 80 88 
South East* 33 72 90 
Southern* 33 92 93 
Sutton and East Surrey 23 49 60 
Thames* 23 37 52 
'Serious' stress (unweighed) 36 64 76 
Bristol 27 49 65 
Dee Valley 41 59 65 
Dwr Cymru 25 40 47 
Northumbrian 28 43 50 
Portsmouth 8 28 37 
SembCorp Bournemouth 46 68 76 
Severn Trent 28 43 49 
South Staffordshire (Cambridge) 38 42  
South West 55 79 84 
United Utilities 21 40 49 
Wessex 37 64 79 
Yorkshire 31 50 60 
'Not serious' stress (unweighed) 32  50   59 
Sources: Meters from 2008 from EA (2008), 2015-2016 from Ofwat (2011a), 2019-2020 from Duff (2015); Stress EA and NRW 
(2013). 
PWCs with '*' are implementing universal metering. 'Unweighted' averages give PWCs equal weights. Population-weighting 
would reflect national progress but obscure progress by PWC. NB: Northumbrian now includes Essex and Suffolk, which was 
previously listed as having 'serious stress'. 
Rationalising demand 
Demand for water can fall in two ways. In the first, an 'inward shift of the demand curve' results in less 
water use, regardless of the price of water. This shift can be caused by a change in tastes, income, 
technology, etc. In the second case, higher prices result in a 'slide down the demand curve', such that 
quantity demanded is lower.6 Although academics debate the relative impacts of shifting and sliding, 
there is no doubt that these changes reinforce each other, i.e. higher prices call attention to use, which 
then result in a change in attitudes or technologies affecting use. It is this logic that makes meters an 
important part of demand management. Meters can shift demand in by calling attention to water use, 
but they definitely slide demand down by moving the unit price of water above zero. 
These effects are hard to separate in practice because it is common to introduce meters with 
volumetric charges. The 1989-92 Isle of Wight field trials found that meters reduced demand by 22%, 
                                                          
6
 For a discussion of 'shift' methods and effects, see Zadeh et al. (2014); for a comparison of shift vs. slide effectiveness, see 
Loaiciga and Renehan (1997) and Reynaud (2013). See Zetland and Gasson (2012) and Hoque and Wichelns (2013) for reviews 
of water tariffs around the world.  
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with half the reduction coming from a fall in consumption and half coming from leak repairs (EA, 2008). 
In other studies of combined impacts, NAO (2007) reports that demand drops by 9-21 and 10-15% for 
optant and compulsory meters, respectively while Pymer (2012) concluded that the existence of meters 
and volumetric charges cut demand for 6,000 Wessex Water consumers by 15%. Looking at price 
effects alone, Dalhuisen et al. (2003) estimated a price elasticity of -0.35 in a meta-analysis of 64 studies 
while Zetland and Gasson (2012) estimate a price elasticity of -0.37 from a sample of 61 cities scattered 
around the world. 
Volumetric prices encourage households to repair leaks, replace old appliances and reduce outdoor 
water use (a practice less common in the UK than regions such as the Western US where detached 
houses and lawns are common), but higher prices are more likely to result in higher bills than lower 
indoor use after some point. Such an outcome may be acceptable if volumetric prices are aimed at 
allocating costs rather than reducing demand, but that goal must be explicit if PWCs want to avoid 
accusations of morally inappropriate profiteering (Ferguson, 2014). Defra (2008) proposes reducing 
current consumption of 150 litres/capita/day (lcd) to 130 or 'as low as' 120 lcd by 2030. Those levels 
should not be hard to reach (many Europeans use less without suffering), but averages can distract 
attention from outlying, vulnerable groups – an issue addressed below. 
Improving customer service 
Water meters transform water users from passive consumers taking what (RV-funded) services they are 
given into active customers entitled to value for money. On the downside, meters turn water use into a 
financial obligation, increase financial risk via variance in charges, and increase costs to PWCs (installing 
and reading meters) and consumers (understanding and paying bills). On the upside, meters let users 
influence their water charges, reduce their responsibility for neighbours’ behaviour, and make PWCs 
more responsive (whether by regulatory obligation or profit-maximisation) to customers. 
These predictions, based on economic theory, might contradict consumer perceptions susceptible to 
bias ('free' services tend to be more popular than their paid equivalents), but Dalziel et al. (2014) report 
that metered consumers are more likely to be satisfied with their value for money than unmetered 
consumers (73 vs. 66%). Among the metered group, optants were more satisfied (77%) than those who 
moved into metered properties or had meters compulsorily installed (70 and 66%, respectively). 
Impacts on PWCs 
Meters may be unattractive to PWCs. Meters replace reliable fixed charges with fluctuating volumetric 
charges that discourage consumption. Charges for leaks and mistakes mean that consumers sometimes 
complain of 'shocking' bills in tabloid stories whose bad publicity disrupts managers’ preference for a 
'quiet life' (Bakker, 2001; Lach et al., 2005; Davies, 2013). PWCs cannot even make outsized profits from 
installing meters or encouraging greater consumption – Ofwat uses TOT(al)EX(pense) rather than 
CAPEX to set PWC prices based on targeted sales volumes. Ofwat does not hesitate to help PWCs cover 
their debt service, but it has also imposed 'negative price limits' (in 1999) and 'challenged business 
plans' (2014) when PWC profits grew too fast (Bakker, 2001; NAO, 2007, 2014; Marshall, 2013; Ofwat, 
2014b). 
Ofwat’s focus on total expenses can make metering more attractive to PWCs by reducing demand, 
and thus their need to invest in capital infrastructure and new sources of supply. The value of avoided 
capital investments, according to Walker (2009) is £0.14-0.66 per m3 not demanded. Add the 
nonmonetary costs of controversy over expanding supply or straining ecosystems, and metering is 
more appealing. 
PWCs face ongoing criticism over their costs and prices. On the one hand, they have an obvious 
incentive to skimp on costs to increase profits (Coles, 2015). On the other, it must be acknowledged 
that PWCs have invested over £100 billion in their systems since 1989 (Ofwat, ndb). Prices were bound 
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to rise to repay those costs, as well as reward risk – even if that risk sometimes comes from Ofwat (e.g. 
Bakker 2001). 
Putting this discussion (worthy of another paper) aside, it is worth comparing the English PWCs with 
their less capitalist neighbours, even while acknowledging their widely diverging initial conditions and 
actions since 1989. DCWW has below-average metering penetration and water stress. Its consumers 
see meters as a means of helping poor families (via subsidies collected from heavy users); they do not 
worry about financial exploitation, as DCWW uses excess revenues for consumer dividends, price 
reductions and environmental improvements (Owen, 2015). Indeed, Dalziel et al. (2014: 10) report that 
consumers in Wales "were more supportive of the option to use profits gained from water companies 
doing better than expected to provide financial help to those on low incomes than consumers in 
England", at 47 and 41%, respectively. These attitudes extend to other measures of satisfaction, i.e. 
value for money (69 vs. 78% in England and Wales, respectively), fair charges (54 vs. 59%), and trust 
(7.3 vs. 7.7 out of 10). This pattern also appears to apply to Scottish Water, which had lagged behind 
English companies in performance, cost and customer satisfaction but now supplies services at the top 
of the range at prices that are some of the lowest in the UK (WIC, 2006; Ofwat, 2007; Scottish 
Water, 2013). Scottish water, it is worth noting, has not encouraged residential consumers to switch to 
water meters (current service charges are based on a Scottish version of RV). Consumers who want 
meters must pay the £300 survey and installation cost themselves. These comparisons suggest that 
PWCs must be careful to avoid the impression they are pushing meters to increase profits. 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
The EA faces no such qualms as it tries to reduce the impact of PWC demand (a private good 
representing the majority of consumptive use) on common pool environmental waters 
(Defra, 2008; Defra et al., 2015). Among EA’s many initiatives, its reforms of abstractions licenses 
(retiring licenses, higher fees in stressed areas) are pressuring PWCs to reduce abstractions and leaks in 
basins where demand exceeds minimum variable flows (Young, 2012; Defra, 2013; EA, 2015).7 The 
following subsections expand on those points. 
Reducing abstractions 
Water supplies in England and Wales tend to be higher in northern and western regions due to 
favourable precipitation patterns, surface flows and groundwater resources. Demand tends to be 
higher in the richer, more densely populated southeast. Leakage – call it either an increase in demand 
or decrease in supply – is worse where the networks are old and street repairs expensive, but it has 
dropped by one-third since 1990, to an average of just over 20% of PWC’s distributed water 
(Kavanagh, 2013). These supply, demand and leakage factors help explain why the southeastern region 
around London has water-stress levels (water per person) similar to those of Spain and Italy (EA, 2009). 
The Environment Agency sees meters as a key instrument for reducing demand in water-stressed areas: 
Figure 1 shows how reductions in demand and leakage might close the supply-demand gap ('CCRA 
projections') contributing to water stress. 
Water stress may justify metering in the southeast, but the impetus is weaker in the rest of the 
country. Figure 2 shows national water stress is falling. Figure 3 shows that this progress is uneven.8  
                                                          
7
 If abstractions are 30% of spring flows but 60% of fall flows, then a 10% reduction in abstractions means 3% more water in 
spring but 6% more in the fall. Flows on the Thames vary from 7 to 160 m
3
/s, so reduced diversions can have a big impact 
(NRFA, 2013).  
8
 Gogol et al. (2014) criticised the right figure as understating stress. Several PWCs had their water stress switched from 
'serious' in the 2012 draft to 'not serious' (formerly 'moderate stress') in EA and NRW (2013).  
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Figure 1. Proposed measures for reducing the projected 2035 water deficit ('CCRA projections') in 
England and Wales. 
 
Error bars on 'CCRA projections' indicate the largest (bottom) and smallest (top) estimates of deficits; these explain the same 
error bars (net of proposed measures) on the 'residual surplus/deficit' estimate.  
Source: Catovsky et al. (2012, Figure 3.2). 
Figure 2. The Water Exploitation Index (WEI) compares abstractions to long-term freshwater resources 
for the 1990-2007 base period. Source: EEA (2010). 
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Figure 3. Water stress in England and Wales. 
 
Source: EA and NRW (2013). 
These figures explain why some PWCs shown in Table 2 have more meters than others, but the general 
trend is for more meters. Metering is expected to increase by 18% in both 'serious' (64 to 76%) and 
'nonserious' (50 to 59%) service areas by 2020 (Catovsky et al., 2012). 
Although perhaps outdated, Table 3 presents meters as the least-cost means of 'improving supply', 
according to EA (2009). Those examples are limited in their scope (it may be cheaper to reduce demand 
via education, regulation or reforming the abstraction regime), but they put context on the comparison 
in Walker (2009) between the £1.50/m3 cost of installing meters and estimated benefits of £0.50/m3 
from carbon savings and lower operating costs and £0.50/m3 representing a 'placeholder value' for 
environmental flows, a net loss discussed below. 
Table 3. EA estimates comparing the cost of meters to other sources of supply. 
Option Range of costs (£/m3) 
Near-universal (90%) metering 1.40-1.60 
Groundwater development  1.00-5.00 
Surface water development  1.00-5.00 
New reservoir  3.00-10.00 
Desalination plant  4.00-8.00 
Source: EA (2009, Table 4.1). NB: Walker (2009) estimates desalination would cost £2/m
3
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Reducing leaks 
Meters make it easier to identify and repair leaks. EA (2008) reports half the level of leakage in metered 
supply pipes, i.e. where a meter at the edge of the property means that the consumers pays for water 
losses between the street and their residence. Would it be cheaper (more efficient) to repair 
distribution leaks instead of installing household meters? Although Figure 4 supports that claim, 
Figure 1 – showing double the reduction from reducing demand as the reduction from reducing leaks 
seems to contradict it. It is probably best to pursue both options in a 'portfolio' attack on leakage 
(NAO, 2007). 
Figure 4. Distribution vs. supply pipe (consumer line) leakages. 
 
Source: Catovsky et al. (2012, Figure 3.9). 
Ofwat compares distribution leaks to its targets for the 'economic level of leakage' (ELL) – the level at 
which the cost of leak repairs equals the value of lost water. EA builds on ELL in targeting a 'sustainable 
economic level of leakage' (SELL) that "takes account of the social and environmental costs and benefits 
of leakage management" (EA, 2009: 55-56). SELL will always be lower than ELL because it includes 
seasonal variations, minimum flows, and other environmentally important conditions ignored in 
discussions of average flows (see Footnote 8). In theory, SELL should include other nonmonetary costs 
such as the cost of contamination that may result from leaks of sewage into drinking-water or 
stormwater pipes, the cost of greater risk from system failures, and so on. Such an accounting would 
usually result in a 'minimise all leaks' policy such as those of Singapore and the Netherlands, but such a 
policy is considered too expensive in the UK (Tortajada, 2006; Kavanagh, 2013; Jonker, 2016). 
Reducing carbon emissions 
Ofwat (2011b) includes reduced carbon emissions from using less energy to treat, move and heat water 
in its cost-benefit study of metering adaption rates. These calculations show a net loss of £1.2 billion 
under a business-as-usual scenario that achieves 90% metering penetration by 2050.9 That loss grows if 
metering goes faster (2020) but falls slightly ( – £1.0 billion) with a 2030 target. These negative values 
might suggest a conclusion against metering, but both Ofwat (2011b) and Walker (2009) – who also 
                                                          
9
 The loss would be greater if we used an early-2016 carbon price of £5 per ton of CO2e rather than Ofwat’s prices of £20 (£50) 
per ton of CO2e traded (nontraded) — values that implied carbon-related benefits of £900 million from metering.  
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calculates a net cost – recommend metering. As an explanation, Duff (2015) clarified that Ofwat 
recommended the 2030 universal metering target because stopping at the 2011 level of 38% metering 
(at zero net cost) was not an option. These results suggest that the government has decided to pursue 
metering despite weak economic and environmental benefits. The next section explores whether social 
benefits might fill the gap. 
SOCIAL IMPACTS 
Earlier sections explained how it might make sense to move water services out of a social equity (water 
as a right) management paradigm in which water and costs were shared among citizens and into an 
economic equity (pay for use) paradigm that would make it easier to assign costs, reduce use and 
reduce free riding that strained PWCs, the environment and taxpayer patience. These transitions, 
although sensible from an economic efficiency perspective, might create problems if the water charges 
system is also being used to alleviate poverty. The following sections will describe how meters 
unwound cross-subsidies between home owners and water users as well as the impact of metered 
prices on the poor. They will also explain how 'water poverty', which predates privatisation and 
metering, should be addressed by national policies rather than by the water sector, a topic discussed in 
the conclusion. 
Unwinding cross-subsidies 
A shift from RV-charges to metered charges better allocates costs in proportion to use. Although some 
feel this is fairer (Matthews, 1992; Heino and Takala, 2015), others disagree due to their opinion that 
RV-charges subsidise the poor (Staddon, 2008). This perception requires that rich people in high RV-
houses use less water than poorer people in low-RV houses, but these are not the facts. Rich people 
tend to use more water (so they would pay more with meters), and they do not always live in the 
higher-RV houses, as the correlation between RV and wealth (whatever its initial level) has attenuated 
since 1990. Ofwat (2011a: 15-16) "estimates that the rateable value system currently means a cross-
subsidy of about £560 million per year from small households living in properties with high rateable 
values to large households living in properties with low rateable values". In terms of income, larger 
households are not necessarily poorer, i.e. "for each low-income household that benefits from being in 
the lowest rateable value band, almost twice as many middle- and higher-income households get that 
same benefit – so only about 30% of the help accorded to the lowest rateable value band (£180m) is 
going to the poorest households" (Walker, 2009: 61). Figure 5 shows the weak correlation between RV 
and income. 
Although these data cast doubt on claims that unwinding subsidies among consumers in a PWC’s 
service area would disproportionately burden poorer households, the government implemented four 
measures to help optants switch. It introduced WaterSure, which limited monthly charges to consumers 
with medical conditions or three or more minor children. Second, Ofwat implemented a 'differential 
test' to divide fixed system charges fairly between metered and unmetered households, i.e. those with 
water meters paid a 'differential surcharge' because their service had higher costs. Third, optants could 
cancel their meter (returning to RV-charges) within 12 months of installation. Finally, Ofwat required 
PWCs to set volumetric charges based on average unmetered use, thereby ensuring that optants who 
used less than this average would save by switching. 
In practice, Ofwat’s rules meant optants would save if their water charges fell by more than the 
differential surcharge of £35 (average water and sewerage charges are £385) per year (Ofwat, 2009; 
Collinson, 2015). Given average household consumption of 126.5 m3 per year (2.3 people using 55 
m3/capita (Ofwat, 2009)), a household could cover the differential with a 12 m3 reduction in use 
(assuming water/sewer cost of £3/m3). A household could also save if they replaced higher RV-based 
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charges with lowered metered charges. These complex 'what ifs' explain the popularity of CCW’s 
'Should you switch?' calculator (CCW, 2016). 
Figure 5. The correlation between rateable value and household income is weak. 
 
Source: Walker (2009, Figure 11). 
Figure 6. Average use per unmetered consumers rises as users with lower (potential) consumption opt 
for meters, leaving remaining unmetered consumers to share responsibility for unmetered 
water on the network.  
 
Source: Catovsky et al. (2012, Figure 3.3). 
Ofwat also created a dynamic incentive to switch by increasing the 'average imputed use' for 
unmetered consumers as low-use optants departed (Walker, 2009). Figure 6 shows the trend, which 
translates, assuming system costs are allocated by use, into higher charges per remaining unmetered 
consumer. Rising RV charges encourage the next group of lower-than-average-use consumers to opt for 
meters in a 'snowball process' that leaves unmetered only the people with the heaviest use, lowest RVs 
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and/or anti-meter attitudes paying RV-charges (Oliver et al., 1985). Those users face the worst of both 
worlds: rising charges for doing nothing and uncertainty over charges if they do something (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). In a Kaldor-Hicks world, it would make sense to reduce their risk so they switch to 
meters, but assistance is very limited. 
Impacts on the poor 
The switch from RV to metering did not affect consumers whose use and RV were correlated, but it 
created winners and losers where the correlation was reversed. Most consumers who switched to 
meters changed their water consuming habits, fixed leaks, or installed efficient appliances. Some who 
faced higher bills switched back to RV-charges, but the rest may be worse off. Doward and 
Ledwith (2011), for example, report that 15% of Wessex Water’s metered consumers saw annual water 
bills increase by £100 or more (the percentage with lower bills is not mentioned). 
Bradshaw and Huby (2013) report that about 24% of households experience 'water poverty', i.e. 
spending more than 3% of household income on water. (The poorest 20% of households spend about 
12% of their income, in roughly equal shares, on water, gas and electrical bills.) A further breakdown of 
characteristics reveals that single-headed households and those on benefits (income support) are 
roughly twice as likely to be 'water poor'. The share of water poor is lower among households with 
meters (18%) than those without (25%). Metering, in other words, does not cause water poverty and 
may be able to alleviate it, but the problem is more the result of low income than meters or expensive 
water (recall the equal shares spent on gas and electricity). 
The government’s WaterSure programme is supposed to help the poor, but it is available only to 
households with three minor children or an occupant with a medical condition that requires copious 
quantities of water. According to Ofwat (2015), 95,000 English and 36,000 Welsh households receive 
assistance from WaterSure or its Welsh equivalent – far below the 700,000 households (roughly 3% of 
the population) with three or more children that Walker (2009) suggested for enrolment – and only a 
fraction of the 22 million households served.10 
These facts may explain why Defra (2012) 'clarified' that PWCs could use surcharges on some 
consumers to subsidise a 'social tariff' for consumers identified as poor. According to Ofwat (2015), 14 
of 18 major PWCs have introduced social tariffs (the rest are exploring their options), but total 
enrolment is only 100,000 households. The government’s recommended surcharge to fund subsidies – 
1.5% of the average, full-tariff bill (£5 per year) – would probably not provide enough funding to 
subsidise the roughly 25% of consumers with 'unaffordable' bills, but even that surcharge may be too 
much (Dalziel et al., 2014). Creative Research (2010) reports that only 39% of UK water consumers are 
willing to pay an additional £2 per year to help others. 
Service cutoffs for nonpayment had increased prior to privatisation in 1989, but they attracted 
plenty of political attention after that date (Bakker, 2001). PWC and Ofwat attempts to adjust were 
ended by a ban on cutoffs (via Parliament, 1999) that merely treated the symptoms of poverty. Some 
households have been able to escape debt by installing meters. Others – metered or not – have rising 
debts but little or no help from WaterSure or social tariffs. Protected from disconnection, these 
households may stop paying their bills. PWCs are allowed to seize household assets, but most probably 
want to avoid confrontations and bad publicity (Citizens advice, 2015). At the end of 2015, households 
owed over £2.1 billion, an amount that – if paid by others – adds £21 (about 5%) to the average 
household’s annual charges. The current situation is bad for those struggling with debt, bad for those 
                                                          
10
 Another 'assistance scheme' discussed in Ofwat (2015), Water Direct, has nearly 280,000 households enrolled, but the 
programme’s only function is to facilitate direct deductions from benefits support against water bills in arrears.  
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paying more to cover the costs of that debt, and bad for the reputation of a metering programme that 
could have been represented as an efficient and fair way to help the poor. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Meters help consumers understand their water use, find leaks and reduce their demand in response to 
conservation awareness or financial incentives. Meters increase consumer-utility engagement by 
replacing fixed, unavoidable charges with payment for service volumes. Meters make it easier for 
utilities to manage demand and track waterflows, which can help with reducing distribution leaks and 
environmental abstractions. Meters also shift water services from a social sphere in which water and 
costs are shared among consumers in a common pool to an economic sphere in which payments reflect 
private use. This system can be efficient and fair if 'losers' in the shift are temporarily protected from 
the loss of subsidies they had received from common-pool allocations, but the shift can be financially, 
socially and politically stressful if losers abruptly face higher costs for the same benefits. 
The UK government’s programme for metering has been stymied and sidetracked by perceptions 
that metering is increasing water poverty, even though water-related household debt predates 
metering and service charges are even more burdensome on households without meters. Although the 
government insists that financial responsibility rests with households (pay for what you use) or PWCs 
(pay for your neighbour’s use), there are reasons for the central government to provide debt relief and 
financial support to poorer families. 
From a regulatory perspective, it may make sense for the government to reduce the financial burden 
placed on water users as PWCs improve infrastructure to meet stricter regulations and reduce 
environmental extractions. Current government payments to South West Water consumers in 
compensation for undue infrastructural cost burdens (compare Defra, 2011a and Defra, 2011b) provide 
a template for additional transfers related to common pool or public goods. Approaching the challenge 
from a different perspective, it is clear that the government could increase subsidies to households too 
poor to pay for basic water service – as is done in Chile (Chávez and Quiroga, 2002) – in the mirror 
image of policies collecting additional taxes from wealthy citizens. 
The UK government needs to do a better job in explaining why it wants universal metering in 
England and Wales when its own figures indicate a net loss (in economic and environmental terms) 
from metering, Scottish Water is 'doing fine' without meters, and metered charges add – rather than 
reduce – financial strains to the poorest households. After carrying out that step, it can implement a 
judicious programme of transfers and taxes, as a complement to tariffs on metered water use, to help 
citizens buy the water they need while protecting the operational and fiscal integrity of English and 
Welsh PWCs. Metering makes it easy to supply water as a private good, but metering will not work if it 
threatens common pool goods – such as the environment or social protection – that citizens also value. 
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